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from the obligation to make repairs and the tenant knew of the defective
condition of the premises which caused the injuries. Accord: Goldberg
v. TUnderlich, 248 Ky. 798, 59 S.W. (2nd) I18 (933) where the
court held that a clause in the lease exempting the landlord from liability
for failure to repair does not relieve him from liability to third persons.
In consonnance with this view is that of the court in Barron v.
Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 104 N.W. 289 (1905) which placed the land-
lord's liability not on his contractual obligation to repair, but on his
negligence. The contract to repair is a mere matter of inducement from
which arises the landlord's duty to exercise care as to the condition of
the leased premises.
Collison v. Curtner, 14I Ark. 122, 216 S.W. 1059 (1919) held
that the landlord was liable for injuries to third persons, invited on the
premises by the tenant. And in Robinson v. Heil, 128 Md. 645, 98 Ad.
195 (1916), the court held that the landlord's liability for injuries to a
member of the tenant's family is practically the same as to the tenant
himself.
In the cases quoted in this comment, the Ohio courts have made no
effort to deal with the challenge of the minority view. The trends of
the day are to place the burdens of responsibility upon the backs of the
strong; not on the weak. Where the great traditions of the Law afford
a logical and reasonable departure from the harsh interpretations of its
principles, without doing violence to its logic and rules, it would seem
that the courts are dutibound to do so. The minority view seems more
in harmony with modern economic and social changes.
JosEPH FREEDMAN
Master and Servant
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION - LEGAL TRAUMA - RECOVERY
FOR INJURIES NOT COMPENSABLE UNDER THE ACT -
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
The plaintiff was a saleslady in a dress goods department of the
Elder and Johnson Co. of Dayton, Ohio. The plaintiff's duties were
to handle ready made dresses, some of which were dyed completely, and
others partially. The plaintiff had been working for seven years, and the
court assumed for the purpose of discussion that during this period par-
ticles of dye had come in contact with her eye at various times, finally
causing chemical conjuctivitis. Compensation was refused because the
disease sustained was not one listed under the Occupational Disease List
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of Section 1465-68 of the Ohio General Code, I 14 Ohio Laws 28
(x931). Furthermore, the plaintiff's condition was held not to be such
an injury as was contemplated under the Ohio Workman's Compensa-
tion Act. The court said the injury must be one of physical character,
or what is known in Ohio as legal trauma. Industrial Commission v.
.drmacost, 129 Ohio St. 176 (i935).
"Traumatic injury is a bodily wound or injury directly resulting
from contact with an external, independent influence or cause." The
Great itlantc and Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W.
(2d) 87 (932). See Industrial Commission v. Middleton, 126 Ohio
St. 212, 184 N.E. 835 (i933).
The court in the A4rmacost case, supra, by denying the claimant
compensation, in effect denied her any possible xecovery under Ohio
law. This is due to the doctrine of Mabley and Carew Co. v. Lee, a
minor, 129 Ohio St. 69, 193 N.E. 750 0934). The employer is
now relieved of common law liability to his employees for injuries
arising from the employment, even though they are not compensable
under the Act. The court there intimated, Judge Zimmerman dis-
senting, that when the people of Ohio voted for the amendment to
Art. II, Sec. 35 of the Ohio Constitution, authorizing enactment of the
Compensation Act, they did so with the intention of taking from the
employee a common law right, regardless of whether the wrong might
be compensated for under the ensuing Act or not. See Case Comment
in Ohio BAR, Vol. 7, No. 51, p. 718 (March i8, 1935). In the Lee
case, referred to, there was a statute limiting the hours of labor, the
breach of which caused the plaintiff nervous and physical exhaustion,
which was held not compensable, but which in the absence of a Compen-
sation Act might have given rise to a common law action on the theory
of violation of the statute as negligence per se. But the court's attitude
was that this statute could not affect the interpretation of certain clauses
in Art. II, Sec. 35 of the Constitution: "Such compensation shall be in
lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages, for such death, in-
juries or occupational disease.. .". The court has thus denied recovery
at common law for injuries which are not compensable under the Act
as well as for those which are.
If it be conceded that the Constitution absolves the employer of all
common law liability, should not the court be more liberal and allow
recovery for an injury that has heretofore gone uncompensated? The
Ohio doctrine is that "it is the tear that is compensable and not the
wear." Industrial Commission v. Bartholome, 128 Ohio St. 13, 190
N.E. 193 0934 So the problem is: when should be attribute an
injury to wear, and when to tear?
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Death from heart attack caused by breathing dust laden air has
been held compensable. Carrol v. Industrial Commission, 69 Co1. 473,
195 Pac. 1097, 19 A.L.R. 107 (192o); "injury" within the Work-
man's Compensation Act is sufficiently established by evidence tending
to show the tangible impact in his employment, of particles of granite
upon the lungs of a granite cutter, In Re Sullivan, 265 Mass. 497, 164
N.E. 457, 62 A.L.R. 1458 (1929); blindness due to vapor of wood
alcohol used by a sign writer has been held compensable, Fidelity and C.
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 177 Cal. 614, 171 Pac. 429, L.R.A.
1918 F, 856 (1918). In a case similar to the principal one, a New
York court has held that ordinarily the lodgment of dirt, or any other
foreign substance, in the eye is an "accident," Guyon v. Standard Wall
Paper Co., 2o9 App. Div. 708, 205 N.Y.S. 28o (1924). A California
Appellate court has given compensation to an employee for infection of
the nose and mouth while engaged in the work of grinding and sacking
wheat and barley, by inhaling dust caused by this work. Hartford Ace.
and Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 32 Cal. App.
481, 163 Pac. 225 (1917). Typhoid fever caused by negligent con-
tamination of drinking water is an "injury" under the Workman's
Compensation Act. Vennen v. New Dills Lumber Co., 155 Wis. 126,
154 N.W. 640 (1915). Compensation has been allowed for pneu-
monia as an "injury" caused by inhalation of gas. Thomson v. A4shing-
ton Coal Co., 17 Times L.R. 345 (19Ol). The weight of authority
is that disease contracted as a direct result of unusual circumstances con-
nected with work is to be considered an "injury" caused by accident.
L.R.A. 19i6A, 290.
On the other hand other courts have held that inhalation of dust
and silica and other dust injuries to the eyes or the respiratory organs are
not compensable if the injury results after a period of time. Williams v.
Guest, Kenn & Mittelfords, I K.B. 497 (1926); Donnelly v. Minne-
apolis Mfg. Go., 161 Minn. 240, 21o N.W. 305 (1924). Inhalation
of dust has been held a disease and not an injury, and the same court
stated that recovery for the injury or disease is not confined to compen-
sation under the Workman's Compensation Act. Smith v. 14ternational
High Speed Steel Co., 98 N.J. Law 574, 12oA. 188 (1923).
It may be gathered from the foregoing illustrations that the question
of whether or not an injury is compensable depends upon the time it
takes for the injured person to feel the effects of the injury. In many of
the other jurisdictions having a Compensation Act, if an injury is not
compensable, then the injured employee may still resort to his common
law recovery against his employer. Jelico Coal Co. v. ddkins, 197 Ky.
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684, 247 S.W. 972 (923); Trout v. Wickware Spencer Steel Corp.,
195 N.Y.S. 528 (1922); Dowing v. Oxweld Acetyline Co., 112 N.J.
Law 25, 169 A. 709 (933). But in Ohio, if the employee does not
sustain a compensable injury under the Act, then he can have no recov-
ery at all. According to the Ohio court's interpretation of Article II,
Section 35, of the Ohio Constitution, an employee gives up all his com-
mon law right to recovery for torts against his employer, and therefore
the complying employer is freed of all common law liability to his em-
ployees even though injured while in the scope of employment. In view
of such an interpretation as this, the court might well be more liberal in
its construction of the word "injury" and thus allow compensation in
cases where now the employee is altogether without relief.
The principal case might have come under the Act had the court
found the injury to be a physical one. It is an old adage that "little
strokes fell great oaks." Thus, if an immediate injury were caused by
each particle of dye, the injury would have fulfilled the requirements of
legal trauma. Where it takes many particles of dye to cause the injury
over a period of time, the injury not being anticipated in the ordinary
course of employment, the court in the principal case denied recovery.
Their rationalization was that trauma caused by a microscpic foreign
substance in contact with the eye during an uncertain period of time is
not such as will be compensable. It would seem, however, that the
injury should have been held compensable, and that the court should not
have differentiated between legal and medical trauma. Regardless of
what adjective is used the injury is still one of trauma.
So long as the Ohio courts adhere to their present position there are
only two ways out of this.situation: amend Article II, Section 35 of the
Ohio Constitution; or carry a similar case to the Supreme Court of the
United States, on the constitutional issue of deprivation of a substantive
right under the due process clause.
SEYMOUR A. TRErrELMAN.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION- SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-
HOME WORK AS A FACTOR
The decedent was being driven to work by her father in the latter's
car to the Francis Willard Public School, where she was employed as a
teacher. Her death was occasioned by the collision of an interurban car
with the automobile in which she was riding. There was testimony that
the preparation necessary for teacher's work could not be fully made
during school hours and that the superintendent had knowledge that
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she was working at home. On the morning in question the decedent
had certain papers with her, the work of her pupils. She had graded
these papers at home. The court held that her death under such con-
ditions was not compensable from the workmen's compensation fund.
Industrial Commission v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. i29, 19o N.E. 400,
40 O.L.B. 524 and 213, 92 A.L.R. 1032 (1934.
As a general rule, in order that an injury may be held to arise out
of and in the course of employment within the meaning of the work-
men't compensation acts, it must have occurred on the employer's prem-
ises, and injuries sustained while going to and from work are not within
the protection of the act. This rule is subject to certain exceptions.
83 A.L.R. 216.
A number of courts have enlarged the scope of employment in
consideration of certain factors; requirements of employment, Stoockley
v. School Dist., 231 Mich. 523 (1925); requests of employer or su-
perior, Kyle v. Greene High School, 208 Iowa 1037, 226 N.W. 71
(i929); lack of adequate facilities and time at place of employment,
Inglish v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ohio St. 494, 181 N.E. 9Ol,
36 O.L.R. 422 (1932); custom and practice, Scrivner v. Franklin
School Dist., 50 Idaho 77, 293 P. 666 (930); and knowledge and
approval of employer, Marshall v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, (Mo.
App.) 184 S.W. 159 (1915); Thurston v. Kansas City Terminal
Ry. Co., (Mo. App.) 168 S.W. 236 (1914); Borley v. Ockenden, 2
[1925] K.B. 325- See also Celina, D., U., N C., Ry. Co. v. Ind.
CoM., 307 IlL. 142, 138 N.E. 289 (1923). Some courts have held
that the basic principles of the Compensation Act, the wording of the
constitution, and the statute with reference to injuries, act as a limita-
tion and therefore exclude from compensation the risks which are simi-
larly encountered by the public generally. The conception of "scope"
is based upon the time and space element. Gintert v. Ind. Com., supra;
Ind. Cor. v. Baker, 127 Ohio St. 345, 188 N.E. 56o (933). Other
courts hold that the proper test is to determine which of the two causes,
the employer's purpose or the employee's personal purpose, was dominant
in causing the employee to travel. Barrager v. Ind. Com., 205 Wis.
550, 238 N.W. 368 (1931); Marks v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 9o , 167 N.E.
181, 78 A.L.R. 684 (1929).
Scope of employment cannot be accurately defined. In its final
analysis it is a question of fact which cannot be determined by the appli-
cation of a rigid rule. The decision in the principal case seems contrary
to the more liberal viewpoint in this respect.
R. HAROLD THOMAS.
